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Abstract
Over the last years, a number of stochastic models have been proposed for analysing the spread of nosocomial
infections in hospital settings. These models often account for a number of factors governing the spread dynamics:
spontaneous patient colonization, patient-staff contamination/colonization, environmental contamination, patient
cohorting, or health-care workers (HCWs) hand-washing compliance levels. For each model, tailor-designed
methods are implemented in order to analyse the dynamics of the nosocomial outbreak, usually by means of
studying quantities of interest such as the reproduction number of each agent in the hospital ward, which is usually
computed by means of stochastic simulations or deterministic approximations. In this work, we propose a highly
versatile stochastic modelling framework that can account for all these factors simultaneously, and which allows for
the exact analysis of the reproduction number of each agent at the hospital ward during a nosocomial outbreak.
By means of five representative case studies, we show how this unified modelling framework comprehends, as
particular cases, many of the existing models in the literature. We implement various numerical studies via which
we: i) highlight the importance of maintaining high hand-hygiene compliance levels by HCWs, ii) support infection
control strategies including to improve environmental cleaning during an outbreak, and iii) show the potential of
some HCWs to act as super-spreaders during nosocomial outbreaks.
Keywords: hospital-acquired or nosocomial infections; antibiotic resistant bacteria; infection control;
stochastic model; Markov chain; reproduction number
1 Introduction1
The risk of acquiring nosocomial infections is a recognised2
problem in health-care facilities worldwide [1]. It has been3
estimated that nosocomial infections affect more than 4 mil-4
lion patients in Europe each year, leading to e7 billion of di-5
rect medical costs [2]. Moreover, the emergence and spread6
of antibiotic resistance among these pathogens has posed7
a second major problem worldwide, stressing the need for8
understanding their transmission routes in health-care fa-9
cilities, and to identify the most effective infection control10
strategies in these settings [3]. A paradigmatic example11
of an antibiotic resistant nosocomial pathogen is bacteria12
Staphylococcus aureus (SA), which is a normal inhabitant13
of the skin and mucosal surfaces, but can cause different14
infections when it flourishes in other areas (e.g., soft tis-15
sue, bloodstream or lung infections). SA resistance against16
Penicillin-like antibiotics arose a few years after the intro-17
duction of Penicillin. Moreover, Methicillin-resistant SA18
(MRSA) strains were reported in Europe after only two19
years of the introduction of Methicillin in 1959 [4]. Cur-20
rently, new strains of MRSA have been reported which are21
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also resistant to Vancomycin [4]. 22
Health-care environments such as hospitals or nursing 23
homes are ideal settings for the spread of multidrug- 24
resistant bacteria (MDRB), due to, among other reasons, 25
opportunities for bacteria to enter into the bloodstream or 26
infect open wounds, the presence of immunocompromised 27
and aged individuals, and the high exposure levels to antibi- 28
otics [5, 6]. The precise mode of transmission is uncertain 29
for many nosocomial pathogens, but usually both exoge- 30
nous (e.g, cross-colonization) and endogenous (e.g. selec- 31
tive pressure of antibiotics) routes are considered as feasible 32
for these pathogens [3]. While for some nosocomial infec- 33
tions most of the transmission is considered to occur via 34
HCW-patient contact routes [7], there is increasing recog- 35
nition in the literature of the potential role played by envi- 36
ronmental contamination and airborne spread [8, 9, 10]. 37
Infection control strategies usually implemented in hospi- 38
tal settings include, among others, hand disinfection proce- 39
dures, environmental cleaning, active screening for coloniza- 40
tion among patients and isolation of colonized individuals, 41
managing staffing levels, antibiotic prescription and decol- 42
onization procedures, or patient cohorting [11]. However, 43
control procedures followed in health-care facilities world- 44
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wide usually amount to combinations of the individual in-45
terventions listed above, so that the efficacy of each indi-46
vidual strategy is hard to measure. On the other hand,47
the application of classical epidemiology procedures for ad-48
dressing this individual efficacy is often not feasible due49
to financial and ethical restrictions [4, 12]. Thus, math-50
ematical modelling is one of the best tools available for51
understanding the role played by different factors on the52
emergence and spread of these pathogens and their antibi-53
otic resistance, while measuring the impact of individual54
interventions [8, 13].55
A wide range of deterministic and stochastic mathemat-56
ical models for the spread of nosocomial pathogens have57
been developed during the last years [2]. Although deter-58
ministic models were originally proposed for capturing the59
main infection dynamics in single wards and hospitals, mod-60
elling efforts were soon redirected towards the stochastic61
perspective due to the small and highly heterogeneous pop-62
ulations usually present in these settings. From a stochastic63
perspective, most of the models proposed in the literature64
are based on Markov processes, where it is assumed that65
inter-event times are exponentially distributed. This sim-66
plifying assumption is usually crucial for analytically and67
computationally treating the processes under study; we re-68
fer the reader to Ref. [3] for a discussion on the advantages69
of stochastic (in particular, Markovian) approaches, and to70
Ref. [2, 14] for systematic reviews in this field. Stochastic71
models in this area can be classified as compartment-based,72
where the population of individuals is classified in groups73
according to their state against the disease, and wide ho-74
mogeneities are assumed among the members within the75
same group, or agent-based, which keep track of the state of76
each individual within the population throughout time and77
allow one to model heterogeneities at the individual level78
[8]. Agent-based models can incorporate heterogeneity in,79
for example, transmission risk profiles of specific patients or80
HCWs [21], but are usually restricted to the implementation81
of stochastic simulations in small wards, and are computa-82
tionally constrained [2].83
When constructing and studying these stochastic mod-84
els, efforts have been focused, and tailor-designed ana-85
lytical and numerical methods have been implemented,86
in order to analyse the dynamics of the nosocomial out-87
break when accounting for spontaneous colonization of88
patients, patient-to-staff and staff-to-patient contamina-89
tion/colonization, environmental contamination, patient90
cohorting, room configuration of the hospital ward, staff91
hand-washing compliance levels, the presence of different92
types of HCWs or specific staff-patient contact network93
structures. This analysis is usually carried out by means94
of studying summary statistics directly related to the noso-95
comial outbreak, such as the reproduction number of each96
particular agent (e.g., of a colonized patient or a contami-97
nated health-care worker) in the hospital ward. This is usu-98
ally computed in an approximative fashion, for example by99
means of stochastic simulations or in terms of determinis-100
tic approximations [15]. On the other hand, the limitations101
of analysing these processes by simulation approaches, and102
the convenience of following exact procedures instead when103
dealing with small populations (such as those usually in-104
volved in nosocomial outbreaks), have been highlighted in 105
Ref. [16]. 106
In this work, we propose a versatile stochastic modelling 107
framework that can simultaneously account for all the fac- 108
tors listed above, and which allows in Section 2 for the 109
exact and analytical study of the reproduction number of 110
each agent at the hospital ward during the nosocomial out- 111
break. We make use of five representative case studies in 112
Section 3, regarding both hypothetical and real nosocomial 113
outbreaks at hospital wards, to show how this unified mod- 114
elling framework comprehend, as particular cases, many of 115
the existing models in the field. We conduct several nu- 116
merical studies and our results in Section 3 highlight the 117
importance of maintaining high hand-hygiene compliance 118
levels by health-care workers, support control strategies in- 119
cluding to improve environmental cleaning during nosoco- 120
mial outbreaks, and show the potential of some health-care 121
workers to act as super-spreaders during these outbreaks. 122
2 A unified stochastic modelling 123
framework 124
In this Section, we propose the unified stochastic mod- 125
elling framework for the spread of nosocomial infections, 126
where agents represented in the model can be of different 127
type (patients, HCWs, surfaces, patients located in different 128
rooms,...). This general framework, which is constructed in 129
terms of a continuous-time Markov chain, allows one to fol- 130
low an exact and analytical approach for computing the 131
reproduction number of each different agent playing a role 132
in the infection spread, which measures the number of in- 133
fections directly caused by this agent until the agent stops 134
spreading the nosocomial pathogen. We also show how this 135
reproduction number can be exactly analysed while deci- 136
phering among which individuals this agent is spreading 137
the disease, so that this becomes a quantitative measure 138
of the infectiousness of a given agent among individuals 139
of different type. This then becomes a useful tool when 140
analysing the role played by different routes of infection 141
during a nosocomial outbreak in a given hospital ward, as 142
shown in numerical results in Section 3. 143
2.1 The model 144
We consider model depicted in Figure 1, which amounts to 145
a stochastic SIS epidemic model with multiple compartmen- 146
tal levels. In Case Studies 1-5 in Section 3, this modelling 147
framework is used to represent the spread of nosocomial in- 148
fections, such as MDRB, within a hospital ward, where the 149
meaning of a compartmental level depends on the particu- 150
lar case study, showing the versatility and flexibility of this 151
unified framework. 152
We consider the stochastic process X = {X(t) = 153
(I1(t), . . . , IM (t)) : t ≥ 0}, where Ij(t) amounts to the 154
number of infectives in compartmental level j at time t ≥ 0. 155
We assume that the number of individuals at each com- 156
partmental level remains constant throughout time, which 157
is directly related to standard assumptions when modelling 158
nosocomial infections; see Section 3. This means that the 159
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number Sj(t) of susceptibles in compartmental level j at160
time t is given by Sj(t) = Nj − Ij(t) for all t ≥ 0. Process161
X evolves among states in S = C ∪ {∆}, where162
C = {(i1, . . . , iM ) ∈ NM0 : 0 ≤ ij ≤ Nj , j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}}.
State (i1, . . . , iM ) represents the presence of ij infected indi-163
viduals at compartmental levels 1 ≤ j ≤M , while the final164
state ∆ represents the detection and declaration of the out-165
break in the hospital ward. In particular, process X transits166
among states in S according to the following transitions:167
• Removal at compartmental level j: (i1, . . . , iM )→168
(i1, . . . , ij−1, . . . , iM ), occurring at rate µj(i1, . . . , iM );169
• Infection at compartmental level j: (i1, . . . , iM )→170
(i1, . . . , ij+1, . . . , iM ), occurring at rate λj(i1, . . . , iM );171
• Detection and declaration of the outbreak:172
(i1, . . . , iM )→ ∆, occurring at rate δ(i1, . . . , iM ).173
This unified model has been developed to account for pa-174
tients, different types of HCWs and/or surfaces involved in175
a nosocomial outbreak in a hospital ward. The generality176
of functions λj(i1, . . . , iM ), µj(i1, . . . , iM ) and δ(i1, . . . , iM )177
allows for incorporating into the model a wide range of fac-178
tors having an impact on the nosocomial spread dynam-179
ics. This means that the particular meaning of each com-180
partmental level 1 ≤ j ≤ M , as well as of each event181
(infections and removals represented by arrows in Figure182
1) depends on the particular hospital ward and pathogen183
under analysis; see Section 3 where compartmental lev-184
els 1 ≤ j ≤ M can represent colonized/non-colonized pa-185
tients, contaminated/non-contaminated HCWs, volunteers186
and surfaces, or can be related to the specific spatial config-187
uration of the hospital ward under analysis, or the particu-188
lar staff-patient contact network (e.g., representing patient189
cohorting).190
Outbreak detection and declaration rate δ(i1, . . . , iM ) al-191
lows one to analyse situations where a nosocomial pathogen192
is introduced for the first time in a given hospital ward (e.g.,193
by admission of a colonized patient), starting an outbreak,194
and the spread dynamics are analysed until the presence195
of this pathogen is detected by HCWs. By conveniently196
specifying the function rate δ(i1, . . . , iM ), different hospital197
surveillance policies (e.g., detection by the first individual198
showing symptoms, by random screening of patients within199
the ward, or by systematic screening upon patient admis-200
sion) can be considered. However, as illustrated in Section201
3, scenarios where the interest is not in the spread dynam-202
ics until detection, but in the long-term infection dynamics203
of the pathogen (e.g., endemic situations) and in assessing204
the infectiousness of each agent within this ward, can be205
analysed by setting δ(i1, . . . , iM ) = 0. We note that set-206
ting δ(i1, . . . , iM ) = 0 means deleting the final state ∆ in207
Figure 1, so that the infection dynamics during the nosoco-208
mial outbreak would amount to the stochastic movement of209
individuals, throughout time, between the susceptible and210
infective compartments at the different compartmental lev-211
els in Figure 1; see case studies 2-5.212
In subsection 2.1, and for a given initial state (I1(0), . . . ,213
IM (0)) = (i1, . . . , iM ), we analyse the exact reproduction214
number for an infective individual in compartmental level 215
j: the number of infections (understood in a broad sense, 216
see Section 3) directly caused by this individual until he/she 217
is removed or until the outbreak is detected, R(j)(i1,...,iM ); see 218
Refs. [17, 18, 19]. Since an infective individual at compart- 219
mental level j can infect individuals at compartmental levels 220
1 ≤ k ≤M , one can split R(j)(i1,...,iM ) =
∑M
k=1R
(j)
(i1,...,iM )
(k), 221
where R(j)(i1,...,iM )(k) is the number of infections directly 222
caused by an infective individual at compartmental level 223
j, among individuals at compartmental level k. In this 224
way, random variables R(j)(i1,...,iM )(k), for 1 ≤ j, k ≤ M , 225
allow one to assess the role played by the different poten- 226
tial routes of infection during a nosocomial outbreak in a 227
hospital ward, in our numerical results in Section 3. We 228
note that the global variable R(j)(i1,...,iM ) measures the infec- 229
tiousness of an infective individual in compartmental level 230
j, until this individual stops spreading the infection (he/she 231
is removed) or until the outbreak is detected and declared 232
(so that control strategies such as antibiotic prescription, 233
isolation of infected individuals, patient cohorting, or en- 234
vironmental cleaning, can be implemented, impacting on 235
the infection spread dynamics). These summary statistics 236
can be studied from the solution of systems of linear equa- 237
tions, by implementing first-step arguments. In the Supple- 238
mentary Material, we explain the corresponding algorithmic 239
procedures designed for solving these systems in a matrix- 240
oriented fashion. 241
2.2 Reproduction number for an individ- 242
ual at compartmental level j, among 243
individuals at compartmental level k 244
For a given compartmental level j and a given initial state 245
(i1, . . . , iM ), we can define the random variable R
(j)
(i1,...,iM )
, 246
which amounts to the total number of infections directly 247
caused by a marked infective individual at compartmental 248
level j until he/she is removed, or until the outbreak is 249
declared. We note that since quantity R(j)(i1,...,iM ) refers to 250
an infective individual at compartmental level j, it is only 251
properly defined for initial states (i1, . . . , iM ) with ij > 0. 252
In case studies 1-5 in Section 3, we focus on initial states of 253
the form 254
(0, . . . , 0, 1︸︷︷︸
j
, 0, . . . , 0),
representing that the infective individual under study is the 255
one at compartmental level j starting the outbreak. For 256
this initial state, the mean value E[R(j)(0,...,0,1,0,...,0)] directly 257
relates to the basic reproduction number (measuring the av- 258
erage number of individuals this individual directly infects 259
until he/she is removed –or, in this case, until the outbreak 260
is detected–, for an initially fully susceptible population). 261
We note that R(j)(i1,...,iM ) is in fact the sum of several con- 262
tributions, 263
R
(j)
(i1,...,iM )
=
M∑
k=1
R
(j)
(i1,...,iM )
(k),
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where R(j)(i1,...,iM )(k) represents the number of infections264
caused, by this individual who is at compartmental level265
j, only among individuals at compartmental level k. The266
analysis of each variable R(j)(i1,...,iM )(k) helps to measure not267
only how infectious an individual that belongs to compart-268
mental level j is, but also how much of a risk he/she is for269
individuals at a given compartmental level k. This allows270
us in Section 3 to explore the role played by the different271
potential transmission routes during a nosocomial outbreak.272
The probability distribution of each random variable273
R
(j)
(i1,...,iM )
(k) is given in terms of probabilities274
ν
(j)
(i1,...,iM )
(k;n) = P(R(j)(i1,...,iM )(k) = n), n ≥ 0.
Since these probabilities refer to a particular infected in-275
dividual, it is necessary to specify the contribution that276
each infective individual has in the global infection rates277
λj(i1, . . . , iM ), as well as the rate at which this partic-278
ular individual is removed. Thus, we analyse quantities279
R
(j)
(i1,...,iM )
(k) and R(j)(i1,...,iM ) for the following family of in-280
fection and removal rates:281
µj(i1, i2, . . . , iM ) = µjij ,
λj(i1, i2, . . . , iM ) =
(
λj +
M∑
k=1
λkjik
)
(Nj − ij),
for 1 ≤ j ≤M , and any outbreak detection and declaration282
rate δ(i1, . . . , iM ). This specification of rates is based on283
the following general assumptions:284
• Each infective individual at compartmental level j is285
removed independently at rate µj ;286
• Each susceptible individual at compartmental level j287
can be infected due to an external source of infection,288
with rate λj , or by an infective individual at compart-289
mental level k, with rate λkj .290
We note that these functions have been defined in this way291
so that they can be used in case studies 1-5 for the spread292
of nosocomial pathogens in hospital wards, where events293
related to rates µj , λj and λkj have specific meanings in294
each case study in Section 3, according to different scenarios295
and hypotheses considered in Refs. [18, 20, 21, 22, 23].296
We follow here a first-step argument conditioning on the
next event to occur in the process. In particular, for the
initial state i = (i1, . . . , iM ), we have
P(R(j)i (k) = n) = P(R
(j)
i (k) = n | i→ ∆)P(i→ ∆)
+
M∑
k=1
P(R(j)i (k) = n | i→ (i1, . . . , ik − 1, . . . , iM ))
× P(i→ (i1, . . . , ik − 1, . . . , iM ))
+
M∑
k=1
P(R(j)i (k) = n | i→ (i1, . . . , ik + 1, . . . , iM ))
× P(i→ (i1, . . . , ik + 1, . . . , iM )). (1)
Notation i → (i1, . . . , ik − 1, . . . , iM ) represents the event297
that, if the process is at state i at present time, the next298
event that occurs in the process is the transition to state 299
(i1, . . . , ik − 1, . . . , iM ) (i.e., a removal occurs at compart- 300
mental level k). The equation above, if we use notation 301
i = (i1, . . . , iM ),
i+(s) = (i1, . . . , is + 1, . . . , iM ),
i−(s) = (i1, . . . , is − 1, . . . , iM ),
leads to the system of equations
θiν
(j)
i (k;n) = (µj + δ(i))1n=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Removal of the marked individual,
or outbreak declaration
+ µj(ij − 1)ν(j)i−(j)(k;n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Removal of an individual,
–not the marked one–
at compartmental level (CL) j
+ 1n>0λjk(Nk − ik)ν(j)i+(k)(k;n− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Infection of an individual at CL k,
caused by the marked individual
+
M∑
p=1, p 6=j
µpipν
(j)
i−(p)(k;n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Removal of an individual
at CL p 6= j
+
M∑
p=1, p 6=k
(Np − ip)
(
λp +
M∑
l=1
λlpil
)
ν
(j)
i+(p)(k;n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Infection of an individual at CL p 6= k
+ (Nk − ik)
λk + λjk(ij − 1) + M∑
l=1, l 6=j
λlkil
 ν(j)i+(k)(k;n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Infection of an individual at CL k, not caused by the marked individual
(2)
for n ≥ 0 and (i1, . . . , iM ) ∈ C, with ij > 0. 1A above is a 302
function equal to 1 if A is satisfied, and 0 otherwise, and 303
θi = δ(i) +
M∑
k=1
(
µkik + (Nk − ik)
(
λk +
M∑
l=1
λlkil
))
.
We note that Eq. (2) is obtained by following arguments in 304
Eq. (1), and conditioning on the next event that can po- 305
tentially occur in the process. For example, let us assume 306
that process is at state i = (i1, . . . , iM ) at present time, 307
and we are computing probability ν(j)i (k;n) = P(R
(j)
i (k) = 308
n), which relates to the reproduction number R(j)i (k) for 309
a marked infective individual at compartmental level j, 310
among individuals at compartmental level k. A poten- 311
tial event which can occur is the recovery of an individ- 312
ual –different to the marked one– at compartmental level 313
j, which by the theory of Markov processes occurs with 314
probability µj(ij−1)θ(i1,...,iM )
, moving the process to the new state 315
i−(j) = (i1, . . . , ij − 1, . . . , iM ). This leads to the addend 316
µj(ij − 1)ν(j)i−(j)(k;n) in Eq. (2), and similar arguments can 317
be applied for the rest of potential possible events that can 318
occur. Finally, we point out that the system of equations 319
given by Eq. (2) can be represented in matrix form, and 320
solved by starting with n = 0, and then sequentially solv- 321
ing the system of equations for any value n ≥ 1 by using 322
previously computed probabilities for n− 1, in an iterative 323
fashion; see the Supplementary Material. 324
It is clear that, since 325
R
(j)
(i1,...,iM )
=
M∑
k=1
R
(j)
(i1,...,iM )
(k),
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we can also focus on computing probabilities326
ν
(j)
(i1,...,iM )
(n) = P(R(j)(i1,...,iM ) = n), n ≥ 0,
for any initial state (i1, . . . , iM ) ∈ C with ij > 0. Probabil-
ities ν(j)(i1,...,iM )(n) satisfy
θiν
(j)
i (n) =
M∑
k=1, k 6=j
µkikν
(j)
i−(k)(n) + µj(ij − 1)ν
(j)
i−(j)(n)
+ (µj + δ(i))1n=0 +
M∑
k=1
(Nk − ik)λjkν(j)i+(k)(n− 1)1n>0
+
M∑
k=1
(Nk − ik)
λk + M∑
l=1, l 6=j
λlkil + λjk(ij − 1)
 ν(j)i+(k)(n),
(3)
for n ≥ 0 and for any (i1, . . . , iM ) ∈ C, with ij > 0. This327
system is expressed in matrix form, and solved in an itera-328
tive fashion, in the Supplementary Material.329
3 Case studies330
In this Section, we focus on five different representative ex-331
isting models in the literature for the spread of nosocomial332
infections. Our aim is to show how these models can be333
seen as particular cases of the unified stochastic modelling334
framework presented in Section 2, so that the methodology335
in subsection 2.1 can be directly applied, and the infectious-336
ness of each agent in the hospital ward can appropriately337
be quantified. In particular, case studies 1-5 can be rep-338
resented into our framework by specifying the number M339
of compartmental levels and their meaning, as well as the340
meaning of the infection and removal events occurring at341
each compartmental level, and the specifications of rates µj ,342
λj , λjk and δ(i1, . . . , iM ). These rates are general enough343
in Section 2 in order to account for all hypotheses usually344
considered when modelling nosocomial infections (such as345
those considered in Refs. [18, 20, 21, 22, 23] related to case346
studies 1-5), and also allow one to consider different hos-347
pital surveillance policies for outbreak detection and dec-348
laration [24, 25]. A summary of these rates for each case349
study studied in this Section can be found in Table S6 in350
the Supplementary Material.351
3.1 Modelling spread among patients and352
health-care workers353
We focus here on the model by Artalejo (2014) [20], for a354
nosocomial outbreak in a hospital ward with Np patients355
and NHCW HCWs. Patients can be colonized or non-356
colonized at any given time, and are discharged at rate µ,357
regardless of their colonization status. HCWs can have their358
hands contaminated or uncontaminated, and they wash359
their hands at rate µ′. Each colonized patient contami-360
nates (the hands of) each uncontaminated HCW at rate β′,361
while each contaminated HCW colonizes each non-colonized362
patient at rate β. Admission of new patients occurs imme-363
diately after discharge, and newly admitted patients can be364
colonized with probability σ. It is assumed in Ref. [20] that 365
each colonized patient is detected at rate γ, which can be 366
incorporated here by setting δ(i1, i2) = γi1 (i.e., outbreak 367
declaration occurs upon detection of the first colonized pa- 368
tient); see Figure 2. 369
We note that the outbreak detection and declaration rate 370
δ(i1, . . . , iM ) can be set to account for different hypotheses 371
regarding hospital surveillance and screening. By setting 372
δ(i1, i2) = γi1 as above, one can represent random screen- 373
ing being in place as the surveillance policy in the hospital 374
ward, where each patient is screened at an average time 375
γ−1; see Ref. [24] where this screening policy is identified 376
as one of the most efficient ones for the control of noso- 377
comial outbreaks. We also note that outbreak declaration 378
rate δ(i1, i2) = γi1 can also be used to represent the scenario 379
where outbreak is declared after the first colonized patient 380
showing some symptoms, each colonized patient showing 381
symptoms at rate γ (e.g., norovirus outbreaks are declared 382
upon detection of suspected cases, consisting of patients 383
showing symptoms such as diarrhoea and vomiting). On 384
the other hand, if a colonized patient is admitted into a 385
hospital ward, and detection occurs by screening upon ad- 386
mission where laboratory results take an average time δ−1 387
to arrive, one could represent this by setting δ(i1, i2) = δ 388
and with time t = 0 representing the admission of the col- 389
onized patient into the ward. 390
In Figure 2, we show how this model can be repre- 391
sented into our framework, by setting M = 2, N = 392
Np + NHCW , where compartmental level j = 1 amounts 393
to colonized/non-colonized patients and j = 2 amounts 394
to uncontaminated/contaminated HCWs. In order to in- 395
corporate the hypotheses above, rate functions λj(i1, i2), 396
µj(i1, i2) and δ(i1, i2) are defined as in Figure 2, and sum- 397
marised in Table S6 in the Supplementary Material. More- 398
over, summary statistics analysed in Section 2 have spe- 399
cific meanings in this particular case study, as described 400
in Table 1. We note here that an alternative existing ap- 401
proach in the literature, such as the model in Ref. [3], is to 402
consider only colonized/non-colonized patients explicitly in 403
the model, where the role played by contaminated HCWs 404
is only implicitly incorporated via a transmission rate β. 405
Model in Ref. [3] could be represented into our framework 406
by setting M = 1 (colonized/non-colonized patients) and 407
appropriately setting rates µ1(i1), λ1(i1) and δ(i1), which 408
is omitted here for the sake of brevity. 409
We use here parameter values considered in Ref. [20], for
the spread of MRSA in an hypothetical intensive care unit,
which are reported in Table S1 in the Supplementary Ma-
terial. When analysing the infectiousness of colonized pa-
tients and contaminated HCWs, we can focus on computing
the reproduction number of these individuals, as described
in Section 2; see Table 1. While the reproduction number
can be computed, for a contaminated HCW (R(2)(0,1)), by di-
rect application of Eq. (3), a slight modification needs to
be considered when analysing the reproduction number of
a colonized patient; that is, when computing probabilities
ν
(1)
(i1,i2)
(n) = P(R(1)(i1,i2) = n). In particular, Eq. (3) for
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R
(1)
(1,0) = R
(1)
(1,0)(2) Reproduction number of a colonized patient starting the outbreak (among HCWs)
R
(2)
(0,1) = R
(2)
(0,1)(1) Reproduction number of a contaminated HCW starting the outbreak (among patients)
Table 1: Meaning of our summary statistics for model in Figure 2. Case study 1
model and rate functions in Figure 2 leads to
θ(i1,i2)ν
(1)
(i1,i2)
(n) = µ′i2ν
(1)
(i1,i2−1)(n) + 1n=0((1− σ)µ+ γi1)
+ (i1 − 1)
(
(1− σ)µν(1)(i1−1,i2)(n) + (N2 − i2)β′ν
(1)
(i1,i2+1)
(n)
)
+ (N1 − i1)(σµ+ βi2)ν(1)(i1+1,i2)(n)
+ 1n>0(N2 − i2)β′ν(1)(i1,i2+1)(n− 1) (4)
with θ(i1,i2) = µ
′i2 + (1 − σ)µ(i1 − 1) + (N1 − i1)(σµ +410
βi2) + (N2 − i2)β′i1 + (1 − σ)µ + γi1. However, we note411
that R(1)(1,0) should amount to the number of infections (i.e.,412
in this case, HCW hands contaminations) directly caused413
by a given colonized patient starting the outbreak until this414
patient is discharged or the outbreak is detected, regardless415
of the newly admitted patient being or not colonized. This416
means that terms 1n=0(1− σ)µ in Eq. (4) and (1− σ)µ in417
θ(i1,i2) need to be replaced by 1n=0µ and µ, respectively, and418
the same applies when analysing the reproduction number419
of a colonized patient in case studies 2-4.420
In Figure 3, we plot the probability mass functions of the421
reproduction number of a colonized patient (R(1)(1,0)) and of422
a contaminated HCW (R(2)(0,1)) starting the outbreak. While423
the average outbreak declaration time is crucial for limiting424
the reproduction number of a colonized patient, this is not425
the case when looking at the reproduction number of a con-426
taminated HCW. This is related to the fact that the main427
limiting factor for the infectiousness of a HCW is his/her428
hand-washing rate, which is something that we explore in429
more depth in the following case studies.430
3.2 Considering different HCW types431
We focus here on the model by Wang et al. (2011) [22],432
which incorporates volunteers working at the hospital ward.433
Authors in Ref. [22] consider the spread of MRSA in the434
Respiratory Intensive Care Unit (RICU) at Beijing Tongren435
Hospital, which is formed by Np patients, NHCW HCWs436
and NV volunteers. As assumed in Ref. [22], patients are437
admitted at rate λ, who can already be colonized upon ad-438
mission with probability ϕ, and discharged at rate δC (if col-439
onized) or δU (if non-colonized). HCW-patient transmission440
rate (1−η)NP βPH consists of two contributions: the hygienic441
level η ∈ (0, 1) during each HCW-patient contact, which is442
encoded in a probability (1 − η) of transmission per con-443
tact, and a contact rate βPH , and similar comments apply444
to volunteer-patient transmission rate (1−ξ)NP βPV ; see details445
in [22, Page 3] and related equations in [22, Appendix]. In446
Figure 4, we depict how this model is represented into our447
framework, in the asymptotic situation where immediate448
arrival of patients is assumed after discharge (i.e., λ→∞),449
which is a reasonable approximation for hospital wards un-450
der high demand [3, 23]. Since no detection is considered in451
Ref. [22], where the interest is in the long-term dynamics of 452
the nosocomial spread and in analysing the infectiousness 453
of each individual in the ward, we set δ(i1, . . . , iM ) = 0. 454
For parameter values in Table S2 in the Supplementary 455
Material, we plot in Figures 5-6 the mean reproduction 456
numbers of the different agents in this ward, for varying 457
values of model parameters. We compute in Figure 5 the 458
mean reproduction number of a colonized patient start- 459
ing the outbreak, among HCWs (E[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)]) and volun- 460
teers (E[R(1)(1,0,0)(3)]), versus (δ
−1
C , η) and (δ
−1
C , ξ), respec- 461
tively. Our results suggest that transmission from patients 462
to HCWs played a significant role in this outbreak, where a 463
given colonized patient contaminates E[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)] = 10.05 464
HCWs during his/her stay in the ward. On the other 465
hand, our model suggests little transmission from colo- 466
nized patients to volunteers, with E[R(1)(1,0,0)(3)] = 0.65. 467
This remains true even though the low hygienic level dur- 468
ing patient-volunteer contacts (ξ = 0.23 for volunteers vs 469
η = 0.46 for HCWs), and seems to be related to the low 470
intensity of these contacts (βPV = 0.2 for volunteers vs 471
βPH = 0.72 for HCWs). Stochastic variability of the repro- 472
duction numbers E[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)] = 10.05 and E[R
(1)
(1,0,0)(3)] = 473
0.65 can also be assessed by our methodology in Section 2, 474
in terms of standard deviations SD[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)] = 10.50 and 475
SD[R(1)(1,0,0)(3)] = 0.94. These are readily obtained from the 476
probability distributions computed from Eq. (2). 477
When looking at possible control strategies, it seems clear 478
that the reproduction number of a colonized patient among 479
HCWs can be significantly reduced by improving the hy- 480
gienic level of each HCW-patient contact, while reducing 481
the length of stay of each patient does not significantly re- 482
duce the infectiousness (i.e., contamination ability) of this 483
patient, and similar comments apply to patient-volunteer 484
contacts. 485
In Figure 6, the mean reproduction number of a contam- 486
inated HCW or volunteer is computed for varying values 487
of the hygienic levels during each contact, as well as of 488
the hand-washing rates. The fact that HCWs wash their 489
hands an average of 24 times per day in this ward keeps the 490
reproduction number of these agents low, and only under 491
significantly low hand-washing compliance levels (γH < 5) 492
a substantial increase for this reproduction number is pre- 493
dicted. Thus, for a particular HCW with low hand-washing 494
compliance level, hygienic level during each HCW-patient 495
contact becomes the most important factor determining the 496
infection spread, and similar comments apply to volunteers. 497
3.3 Assessing environmental contamina- 498
tion 499
The important role played by environmental contamina- 500
tion in nosocomial spread has been discussed in recent 501
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works in the field [8, 9], since pathogens such as MRSA502
and Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) are able to503
survive on dry surfaces for weeks [27]. We consider here504
the model by Wolkewitz et al. (2008) [23], which incorpo-505
rates contaminated/non-contaminated surfaces. Authors in506
Ref. [23] consider Np patients, Ns HCWs and Ne surfaces507
for analysing an VRE outbreak in the onco-haematological508
unit at the University Medical Center Freiburg in Germany.509
Colonized patients are discharged at rate γ′, while non-510
colonized patients are discharged at rate γ. Discharged511
patients are immediately replaced by newly admitted pa-512
tients, who can be colonized with probability φ. HCWs513
wash their hands at rate µ, while surfaces are decontami-514
nated at rate κ. Transmission between patients, HCWs and515
surfaces occur at rates (βsp, βse, βps, βpe, βes, βep), where s516
stands for staff (HCWs), p for patients and e for environ-517
ment (surfaces). In Figure 7, we show how this model can518
be represented into our framework, with the corresponding519
definition of the function rates. Since no outbreak detection520
is considered in Ref. [23], we set δ(i1, i2, i3) = 0.521
In Figures 8-10 we compute the mean reproduction num-522
ber of all the agents (i.e., patients, HCWs and surfaces)523
in this hospital ward, for parameter values in Table S3524
in the Supplementary Material which are the ones con-525
sidered in Ref. [23] for the VRE outbreak in the onco-526
haematological unit, and carry out a sensitivity analysis527
for several model parameters. In particular, we plot in528
Figure 8 the mean reproduction number of a colonized pa-529
tient among HCWs and among surfaces, versus the patient-530
to-HCW (respectively, patient-to-surface) transmission rate531
βps (βpe), and the average length of stay γ′−1 of any given532
colonized patient. For the VRE outbreak considered in533
Ref. [23], an average number of E[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)] = 9.09534
HCWs and E[R(1)(1,0,0)(3)] = 96.83 surfaces are contami-535
nated by a colonized patient during his/her stay in the536
ward, these results suggesting that environmental contam-537
ination might be playing a significant role in the infection538
spread, as suspected by authors in Ref. [23]. Stochastic539
variability of these summary statistics can be represented540
in terms of the standard deviations SD[R(1)(1,0,0)(2)] = 9.40541
and SD[R(1)(1,0,0)(3)] = 73.75, these large quantities suggest-542
ing that the corresponding infection processes are highly543
stochastic. We note that for a colonized patient staying in544
the ward for an average of 20 days, and an environmental545
cleaning rate of κ = 1 time/day, the same surface can be546
contaminated several times by this patient during his/her547
stay. According to results in Figure 8, both reducing the548
average length of stay of patients, and decreasing contact549
rates (i.e., avoiding when possible patient-surface contacts,550
or improving the hygienic level during each patient-HCW551
contact) can help to reduce these mean reproduction num-552
bers.553
Once a HCW is contaminated, his/her infectious poten-554
tial can be measured by means of his/her mean repro-555
duction number, which is analysed in Figure 9. It seems556
clear from results in Figure 9 that the hand-washing rate557
µ = 24 times/day allows to keep this mean reproduction558
number, for a contaminated HCW, low among patients, al-559
though it can be still significant (above 1) among surfaces.560
Results in Figure 9 also suggest that HCWs with signifi- 561
cantly low hand-hygiene compliance levels (µ < 10) could 562
lead to reproduction numbers above 1.75 (among patients) 563
and above 30 (among surfaces), so that our results support 564
the fact that a single HCW with relatively low hand-hygiene 565
compliance level could play a significant infectious role by 566
means of contaminating a large amount of surfaces, and col- 567
onizing several patients, until he/she washes his/her hands. 568
In Figure 10, we plot analogous values for a contaminated 569
surface. Although for parameters considered in Ref. [23] 570
the reproduction numbers of any given contaminated sur- 571
face (among HCWs and patients) are relatively low, given 572
the substantial number of surfaces that can be contami- 573
nated by a colonized patient (Figure 8) or a contaminated 574
HCW with a low hand-hygiene compliance level (Figure 9), 575
these numbers should still not be neglected. It seems clear 576
from Figure 10 that decontamination rate κ = 1 time/day 577
can not be considered as optimal during the course of a 578
nosocomial outbreak, since just by increasing this up to 579
κ = 2 times/day a significant reduction in the reproduc- 580
tion number of any contaminated surface could be achieved. 581
This seems to support existing control policies such as the 582
ones recommended within the national guidelines on the 583
management of outbreaks of norovirus infection in health- 584
care settings [26] issued by the National Disease Surveillance 585
Centre in Ireland, which involve cleaning affected areas of 586
the ward twice daily during norovirus outbreaks. Results 587
in Figure 10 also suggest that, if κ = 1 time/day had to be 588
maintained for any reason, then recommendations among 589
HCWs and patients on reducing as much as possible infec- 590
tious contacts with surfaces during an outbreak could still 591
have a significant impact in reducing the infectivity of any 592
given contaminated surface, specially among patients. 593
3.4 Incorporating space through room 594
configuration of the ward 595
The model by Lo´pez-Garc´ıa (2016) [18] incorporates room 596
configuration into the nosocomial infection dynamics, where 597
the main hypothesis is that for some nosocomial pathogens, 598
the transmission rate between patients in the same room 599
would be higher than the transmission rate for patients in 600
different rooms (this might be the case, for example, when 601
considering airborne transmission [10], if patients in the 602
same room are treated by the same common HCW [21], 603
or when considering isolation rooms where specific control 604
protocols are followed [18]). Since the infection dynamics 605
in Ref. [18] are model for an intensive care unit with four 606
rooms, by a simple SIR epidemic model, where no discharge 607
and arrival of patients is considered, we analyse a more re- 608
alistic scenario here where patients are discharged at rate 609
ν, and immediately replaced by newly admitted patients, 610
who can be colonized with probability pC . A transmission 611
rate βSR is considered for patients in the same room, while 612
βDR is the transmission rate for patients in different rooms, 613
and HCWs are not explicitly included into the model. A 614
spontaneous colonization rate λ is also considered in Ref. 615
[18], and no outbreak detection and declaration is assumed 616
so that we set δ(i1, i2, i3, i4) = 0; see Figure 11 for the rep- 617
resentation into our framework. 618
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For parameter values considered in Ref. [18], reported619
in Table S4 in the Supplementary Material, we compute in620
Figure 12 the reproduction number of a colonized patient621
starting the outbreak at Room 1 (left) and 2 (right), versus622
transmission rates (βDR, βSR). We note that Rooms 3 and623
4 are equivalent to Room 2, and are thus not analysed. It624
is interesting to note that for parameter values considered625
in Ref. [18] the reproduction number of a patient at Room626
1 is E[R(1)(1,0,0,0)] = 1.62, while it is E[R
(2)
(0,1,0,0)] = 1.54 for a627
patient at Room 2. Stochastic variability of these summary628
statistics can be represented in terms of the standard de-629
viations SD[R(1)(1,0,0,0)] = 1.73 and SD[R
(2)
(0,1,0,0)] = 1.67. A630
threshold behavior can be observed in both plots in Figure631
12, where reducing the contact rate between patients in the632
same room does not seem to have a significant effect on the633
reproduction number of a patient starting the outbreak at634
Room 2. For this room, it is the transmission rate between635
different rooms βDR which has a significant impact. This636
seems to support the idea of implementing patient cohort-637
ing as an infection control strategy, where a given HCW638
treating patients in the same room would avoid, when pos-639
sible, to treat patients in a different room during the course640
of a nosocomial outbreak. On the other hand, a param-641
eter threshold can also be observed for a patient starting642
the outbreak at Room 1, but this threshold depends on a643
non-linear combination of the values (βSR, βDR). In par-644
ticular, both reducing the contact rate between patients in645
the same room and between patients in different rooms can646
move the value of the reproduction number near or below647
1.648
3.5 Modelling HCW-patient contact net-649
work with different HCW infection650
risk profiles651
Finally, we focus here on the model by Temime et al. (2009)652
[21], where the potential of some HCWs in a hospital ward653
to act as super-spreaders during a nosocomial outbreak is654
assessed. Temime et al. [21] consider an hypothetical hospi-655
tal ward with three types of HCWs: AP1 (a profile involv-656
ing frequent contacts with a limited number of patients,657
typically a nurse), AP2 (a profile involving fewer contacts658
with more patients, typically a physician), and a peripatetic659
HCW (involving a single daily contact with all patients, for660
instance a therapist or a radiologist). These different HCW661
profiles lead to different transmission risks, where AP1-662
patient contacts can be considered as high risk, AP2-patient663
contacts have moderate risk, and peripatetic-patient con-664
tacts have low risk; see [21, Figure 1]. This is encoded here665
by considering transmission rates βAP1 > βAP2 > βPeri.666
Authors in Ref. [21] consider an hypothetical hospital ward667
with 18 beds, that all HCWs wash their hands at rate µ,668
and that all patients are discharged at rate γ, being imme-669
diately replaced by new non-colonized admitted patients.670
By means of agent-based stochastic simulations, authors671
simulate the spread of a nosocomial pathogen (using data672
for MRSA and VRE) in this ward while incorporating de-673
tails such as the duration of each HCW-patient contact,674
the probability of pathogen transmission during a 20min675
HCW-patient contact, or the existence of day/night HCW 676
shifts. 677
In Figure 13 we represent a simplified version of this 678
model into our framework, for a smaller hospital ward with 679
8 patients, 4 AP1 HCWs, 2 AP2 HCWs and 1 peripatetic 680
HCW, but when considering the same contact network 681
structure than the one studied in [21, Figure 1]. Transmis- 682
sion rates βAP1, βAP2 and βPeri in Table S5 in the Supple- 683
mentary Material are obtained by taking into account the 684
duration of each HCW-patient contact type, as well as the 685
probability of pathogen transmission during each contact, 686
by using values in [21, Table 1] and following the arguments 687
in [21, Supplementary Material I]. Since no outbreak detec- 688
tion is considered in Ref. [21], we set δ(i1, . . . , i11) = 0 689
and 690
λj(i1, . . . , i11) = (βAP1i4+j + βAP2i9 + βPerii11)(Nj − ij),
1 ≤ j ≤ 2,
λj(i1, . . . , i11) = (βAP1i4+j + βAP2i10 + βPerii11)(Nj − ij),
3 ≤ j ≤ 4,
λj(i1, . . . , i11) = βAP1ij−4(Nj − ij), 5 ≤ j ≤ 8,
691
λ9(i1, . . . , i11) = βAP2(i1 + i2)(N9 − i9),
λ10(i1, . . . , i11) = βAP2(i3 + i4)(N10 − i10),
λ11(i1, . . . , i11) = βPeri(i1 + i2 + i3 + i4)(N11 − i11),
µj(i1, . . . , i11) = γij , 1 ≤ j ≤ 4,
µj(i1, . . . , i11) = µij , 5 ≤ j ≤ 11.
Given the complexity of this model, we report in Ta- 692
ble 2 the meanings of our summary statistics in Section 693
2. In Figure 14 we plot the mean reproduction number of 694
a representative colonized patient (e.g., P1,a) starting the 695
outbreak, among those HCWs that treat him/her (AP11, 696
AP21 and peripatetic). These values are mainly domi- 697
nated by βAP1 and γ−1; that is, by the contact rate for 698
high transmission risk contacts and the length of stay of 699
the patient in the ward. For parameters in Table S5 in 700
the Supplementary Material a colonized patient contami- 701
nates around E[
∑
j∈{5,9,11}R
(1)
(1,0,...,0)(j)] = 5.3 HCWs dur- 702
ing his/her stay, with SD[
∑
j∈{5,9,11}R
(1)
(1,0,...,0)(j)] = 5.78. 703
By analysing values of E[R(1)(1,0,...,0)(5)], E[R
(1)
(1,0,...,0)(9)] and 704
E[R(1)(1,0,...,0)(11)] separately, one can decipher that this cor- 705
responds to E[R(1)(1,0,...,0)(5)] = 3.42 contamination events 706
to the AP11, E[R
(1)
(1,0,...,0)(9)] = 1.19 to the AP21 and 707
E[R(1)(1,0,...,0)(11)] = 0.69 to the peripatetic HCW. However, 708
we note that since AP11 only treats two patients, while 709
the peripatetic treats eight patients, the peripatetic HCW 710
might have his/her hands contaminated for longer periods 711
during a nosocomial outbreak. 712
In Figure 15, we plot the mean reproduction num- 713
ber of the AP11 (E[R
(5)
(0,0,0,0,1,0,...,0)(1)]), the AP21 714
(E[R(9)(0,...,0,1,0,0)(1) + R
(9)
(0,...,0,1,0,0)(2)]) and the peripatetic 715
(E[
∑4
j=1R
(11)
(0,...,0,1)(j)]) HCW starting the outbreak. Larger 716
values are found for the peripatetic HCW, even though its 717
low transmission risk per contact (βPeri < βAP2 < βAP1), 718
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R
(1)
(1,0,...,0) = R
(1)
(1,0,...,0)(5) +R
(1)
(1,0,...,0)(9) +R
(1)
(1,0,...,0)(11) Reproduction number of patient P1,a
R
(5)
(0,0,0,0,1,0,...,0) = R
(5)
(0,0,0,0,1,0,...,0)(1) Reproduction number of the AP11 HCW
R
(9)
(0,...,0,1,0,0) = R
(9)
(0,...,0,1,0,0)(1) +R
(9)
(0,...,0,1,0,0)(2) Reproduction number of the AP21 HCW
R
(11)
(0,...,0,1) =
∑4
j=1R
(11)
(0,...,0,1)(j) Reproduction number of the peripatetic HCW
Table 2: Meaning of our summary statistics for model in Figure 13. Case study 5
which is directly related to the large number of patients this719
peripatetic HCW treats. Larger mean reproduction num-720
bers found for AP11 than for AP21 suggest however that721
there exists a trade-off between the transmission risk profile722
of each contact (encoded by rates βAP2 and βAP1) and the723
number of patients that each HCW treats (i.e., the partic-724
ular contact network within the hospital ward). The poten-725
tial for the peripatetic HCW to act as a super-spreader can726
be noticed from a combination of results in Figures 14-15.727
In particular, we note that the infectious potential of the728
peripatetic HCW is enhanced by the fact that this HCW729
might have his/her hands contaminated for long periods,730
since each of the eight patients treated by this HCW, who731
might be colonized, contaminates peripatetic HCW hands732
an average of 0.69 times during their stay. Moreover, it733
is clear from our results that low hygiene levels during734
peripatetic-patient contacts (i.e., increasing values of βPeri)735
might significantly increase the number of patients that this736
HCW colonizes until washing his/her hands, and results in737
Figure 15 suggest that the same applies for his/her hand-738
washing compliance level, which could enhance his/her role739
as a super-spreader during a nosocomial outbreak.740
4 Discussion741
In this work we present a unified stochastic modelling742
framework for the analysis of the spread of nosocomial in-743
fections. This unified model allows one to move from more744
compartment-based models for highly homogeneous scenar-745
ios (M ≈ 1), to agent-based type models when dealing with746
highly heterogeneous settings (M ≈ N). We note that when747
considering the asymptotic case M = N , with Nj = 1 for748
all 1 ≤ j ≤ M , the resulting space of states C contains749 ∏M
j=1(Nj + 1) = 2
N states, since in this case one is in fact750
analysing the SIS epidemic model on a network; see Refs.751
[17, 18]. Our unified framework allows for considering dif-752
ferent hypotheses related to the detection and declaration753
of the nosocomial outbreak, or to analyse the long-term in-754
fection spread when this detection is not relevant. The ver-755
satility of this model allows one to consider a wide range of756
agents involved in the nosocomial outbreak, to account for757
hand-washing compliance levels, environmental cleaning,758
patients arrival/discharge, spatial components such as the759
hospital ward room configuration, different types of HCWs760
corresponding to different pathogen transmission risks, as761
well as specific patient-staff contact network topologies.762
Our methodology within this unified framework allows for763
the exact analysis of the probability distribution of the ex-764
act reproduction number of each agent in the ward. More-765
over, this summary statistic can be split into several ones766
accounting for the infections caused by a given individual767
among individuals of a particular type. This translates into 768
analysing the infectiousness of patients, HCWs, volunteers 769
or surfaces among individuals of each of these groups, so 770
that the role played by each potential contact transmis- 771
sion route can be assessed for nosocomial outbreaks corre- 772
sponding to different health-care facilities and pathogens. 773
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that 774
this analytical approach, which has been usually neglected 775
when analysing infection spread among individuals in pop- 776
ulations of moderate-to-large sizes –due to computational 777
constraints–, is applied in the area of nosocomial infec- 778
tions where populations are usually small and heteroge- 779
neous, making its implementation feasible. We note that, 780
although the focus here has been on studying the reproduc- 781
tion number of each individual, alternative summary statis- 782
tics of interest allowing for first-step analysis (such as the 783
length or the final size of the outbreak, see Refs. [17, 18]) 784
could be analysed in the same way by means of this unified 785
framework and our methodology in Section 2. 786
Our unified framework, together with the analytical ap- 787
proach in Section 2, allows one to exactly compute the cor- 788
responding reproduction numbers, and to use these to assess 789
the role played by the different routes of infection during a 790
nosocomial outbreak. At the same time, the fact that all 791
scenarios in Section 3 -and potentially others- can be rep- 792
resented into our unified framework, means that computer 793
codes developed for solving Eqs. (2)-(3) for the general 794
model in Figure 1 can be readily applied in all these sce- 795
narios, just by specifying the corresponding µj(i1, . . . , iM ), 796
λj(i1, . . . , iM ) and δ(i1, . . . , iM ) rates. On the other hand, 797
we acknowledge that this unifed stochastic framework rep- 798
resented by the diagram in Figure 1 entails several simpli- 799
fying assumptions and limitations. The constant size as- 800
sumed for each compartmental level means that the total 801
number of agents of each type (patients, HCWs, surfaces, 802
volunteers,...) remains constant during the course of the 803
nosocomial outbreak. When focusing on patients, this is 804
only appropriate under high demand situations, where the 805
time during which any given bed is empty is short enough 806
and can be neglected in the corresponding model. Under 807
moderate demand, and if one needs to incorporate empty 808
beds explicitly in the model, the stochastic process in Sec- 809
tion 2 could be modified so that S1(t) (if j = 1 represents 810
the compartmental level corresponding to patients) is in- 811
corporated as an additional variable into the continuous- 812
time Markov chain X , so that S1(t) + I1(t) is not neces- 813
sarily constant throughout time. Moreover, more complex 814
situations such as nosocomial outbreaks occurring across 815
several hospital wards, with patient movement between 816
wards, or competitive scenarios where several bacterial 817
strains (e.g., antibiotic-sensitive vs antibiotic-susceptible 818
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[28]) are spreading simultaneously within the same hospital819
ward, cannot be directly represented into our framework820
by just specifying rates µj(i1, . . . , iM ), λj(i1, . . . , iM ) and821
δ(i1, . . . , iM ). Instead, alternative diagramatic representa-822
tions to that in Figure 1 should be explored, potentially823
including movement of agents between different compart-824
mental levels.825
We also note that our methodology directly depends826
on the fact that the model proposed is a continuous-time827
Markov chain, so that events are Markovian and inter-event828
times are assumed to be exponentially distributed. While829
this is a typical assumption in the literature when analysing830
nosocomial outbreaks from a stochastic perspective, we ac-831
knowledge that the exponential distribution might not be832
appropriate for some particular events in these processes,833
such as patients’ lengths of stay. Although relaxing the834
Markovian assumption in these models is out of the scope835
of this paper, it is worth to point out here that some at-836
tempts have already been made in this area, some of them837
based on the use of phase-type distributions for incorporat-838
ing these non-Markovian events [29, 30].839
Finally, we acknowledge here that additional limitations840
of our approach are of computational nature, related to841
solving systems of around #C = ∏Mk=1(Nk + 1) linear equa-842
tions. However, populations usually involved in nosoco-843
mial outbreaks are small enough for this methodology to844
be efficiently implemented, where specific procedures for845
dealing with systems of equations involving highly sparse846
matrices can be specially useful. We also note that while847
N = 20+5+100 = 125 individuals in case study 3 (patients,848
HCWs and surfaces) lead to analysing a stochastic process849
with #C = 12726 states, only N = 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 +850
1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 15 individuals in case study 5 (patients,851
AP1, AP2 and peripatetic HCWs) lead to #C = 10368852
states, which is directly related to the high level of individ-853
ual heterogeneity introduced into this model (encoded by854
the number of compartmental levelsM = 3 versusM = 11).855
These comments suggest that while agent-based simulation856
approaches should prevail under highly heterogeneous sce-857
narios, such as the complete model by Temime et al. (2009)858
[21], more homogeneous or low-to-moderate heterogeneous859
settings allow for this exact approach to be implemented.860
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Figure 1: Diagram representing the epidemic dynamics among
M different compartmental levels.
Figure 2: Model by Artalejo (2014) [20] and its corresponding
representation in our framework. Our representation leads to
the same stochastic process to that in Ref. [20]. Case study 1
Figure 3: Probability mass functions of the reproduction number
of a colonized patient (R
(1)
(1,0), left) and of a contaminated HCW
(R
(2)
(0,1), right) starting the outbreak. Average detection time of
each patient γ−1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} days. Case study 1
Figure 4: Model by Wang et al. (2011) [22] and its corresponding
representation in our framework. Our representation leads to the
same stochastic process to that in Ref. [22], when λ→∞. Case
study 2
Figure 5: Mean reproduction number of a colonized patient
starting the outbreak, among HCWs (E[R
(1)
(1,0,0)(2)], left) and
volunteers (E[R
(1)
(1,0,0)(3)], right), versus δ
−1
C , η and ξ. Blue dot
corresponds to parameter values (η, ξ, δ−1C ) = (0.46, 0.23, 13.0)
in Table S2 in Supplementary Material, leading to values
E[R
(1)
(1,0,0)(2)] = 10.05 and E[R
(1)
(1,0,0)(3)] = 0.65. Case study
2
Figure 6: Mean reproduction number of a HCW (E[R
(2)
(0,1,0)],
left) and a volunteer (E[R
(3)
(0,0,1)], right), versus γH , η, γV , and
ξ. Blue dot corresponds to parameter values (γH , η, γV , ξ) =
(24.0, 0.46, 12.0, 0.23) in Table S2 in Supplementary Material,
leading to values E[R
(2)
(0,1,0)] = 0.02 and E[R
(3)
(0,0,1)] = 0.01. Case
study 2
Figure 7: Model by Wolkewitz et al. (2008) [23] and its corre-
sponding representation in our framework. Our representation
leads to the same stochastic process to that in Ref. [23]. Case
study 3
Figure 8: Mean reproduction number of a colonized pa-
tient among HCWs (E[R
(1)
(1,0,0)(2)], left) and among surfaces
(E[R
(1)
(1,0,0)(3)], right), versus γ
′−1, βps and βpe. Blue dot cor-
responds to parameter values (βps, βpe, γ
′−1) = (2.0, 2.0, 20.0)
in Table S3 in Supplementary Material, leading to values
E[R
(1)
(1,0,0)(2)] = 9.09 and E[R
(1)
(1,0,0)(3)] = 96.83. Case study
3
12
Figure 9: Mean reproduction number of a HCW among pa-
tients (E[R
(2)
(0,1,0)(1)], left) and among surfaces (E[R
(2)
(0,1,0)(3)],
right), versus µ, βse and βsp. Blue dot corresponds to param-
eter values (βsp, βse, µ) = (0.3, 2.0, 24.0) in Table S3 in Supple-
mentary Material, leading to values E[R
(2)
(0,1,0)(1)] = 0.05 and
E[R
(2)
(0,1,0)(3)] = 1.64. Case study 3
Figure 10: Mean reproduction number of a surface among pa-
tients (E[R
(3)
(0,0,1)(1)], left) and among HCWs (E[R
(3)
(0,0,1)(2)],
right), versus κ, βes and βep. Blue dot corresponds to param-
eter values (βes, βep, κ) = (2.0, 0.3, 1.0) in Table S3 in Supple-
mentary Material, leading to values E[R
(3)
(0,0,1)(1)] = 0.06 and
E[R
(3)
(0,0,1)(2)] = 0.10. Case study 3
Figure 11: Hospital ward room configuration from Lo´pez-Garc´ıa
(2016) [18] and its representation in our framework. Our repre-
sentation leads to an arguably more realistic stochastic process
to that in Ref. [18], where patients arrival and discharge are
incorporated. Case study 4
Figure 12: Mean reproduction number of a colonized patient at
Room 1 (E[R
(1)
(1,0,0,0)], left) and at Room 2 (E[R
(2)
(0,1,0,0)], right)
starting the outbreak, versus (βSR, βDR). Blue dot corresponds
to parameter values (βSR, βDR) = (0.0366, 0.0238) in Table S4
in Supplementary Material, leading to values E[R
(1)
(1,0,0,0)] = 1.62
and E[R
(2)
(0,1,0,0)] = 1.54. Case study 4
Figure 13: Staff-patient contact network from Temime et al.
(2009) [21] and representation in our framework. Our represen-
tation leads to a simplified version of the stochastic process in
Ref. [21], for a reduced version of the hospital ward represented
in Ref. [21, Figure 1]. Case study 5
Figure 14: Mean reproduction number of patient P1a among
all HCWs treating him/her (E[
P
j∈{5,9,11}R
(1)
(1,0,...,0)(j)]), ver-
sus γ−1, βAP1, βAP2 and βPeri, for µ = 24 times/day. Blue
dot corresponds to parameter values (βAP1, βAP2, βPeri) =
(0.35, 0.12, 0.07) in Table S5 in Supplementary Material, lead-
ing to value E[
P
j∈{5,9,11}R
(1)
(1,0,...,0)(j)] = 5.3. Case study 5
Figure 15: Mean reproduction number of an AP1
(E[R
(5)
(0,0,0,0,1,0,...,0)(1)], left), an AP2 (E[R
(9)
(0,...,0,1,0,0)(1) +
R
(9)
(0,...,0,1,0,0)(2)], middle) and the peripatetic
(E[
P4
j=1R
(11)
(0,...,0,1)(j)], right) HCW starting the outbreak,
among the patients that they treat, versus µ, βAP1, βAP2 and
βPeri. Blue line corresponds to parameter values explored in
Table S5 in Supplementary Material. Case study 5
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